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Revitalizing the “civic” and “ethnic” distinction 
Perceptions of nationhood across 44 countries and two decades  
 
Christian Albrekt Larsen, Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies (www.ccws.dk), Aalborg 
University. ******** WORKING PAPER VERSION 19 09 2016 
 
Abstract:  
This article describes how contemporary publics think about the nation along Kohn’s classic distinction 
between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. The article makes three contributes to the existing literature. Firstly, 
it establishes a simple conceptual framework, which facilitates a better interpretation of the two-dimensional 
structure found in this and previous empirical studies. Secondly, it uses multi-classification-analysis to 
establish and interpret the two-dimensional space. The main logic is that perceptions of nationhood evolve in 
a contested “field” or “space”. Thirdly, the article demonstrates how countries are not permanently dominated 
by one perception of nationhood. Using three rounds of ISSP data, the article shows remarkable changes in 
perceptions of nationhood within the last two decades in some countries and stability in others.  
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Introduction 
The distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” perceptions of nationhood has been pivotal for scholarly 
work on nationalism (Kohn 1961[1944]). Arnason e.g. argues that “In the whole literature on nation 
and nationalism, it would be hard to find a more seminal work than Hans Kohn’s ‘Idea of 
Nationalism’ (Arnason 2006: 46). Kohn’s distinction had its roots in Meineke’s (1970[1907]) 
distinction between “staatsnation” (state nation) and “kulturnation” (culture nation). At the same time, 
scholars of nationalism have also heavily criticised the dominance of this distinction. It has been 
argued that the distinction is conceptually unclear, too simple to capture the complex nature of 
perceptions of nationhood and of little relevance for contemporary attitudes to migration. This article 
sets out to revitalize the application of this classic distinction by means of an adjusted conceptual 
framework, a new method to interpret the existing data and analyses of longitudinal data.  
Kohn’s basic argument was that in Western Europe (his examples were France, the UK, The 
Netherlands and Switzerland) the borders of the state where settled prior to the rise of nationalism, 
which created a strong focus on the new democratic procedures that could legitimize the existing 
state. Nationalism therefore contained a narrative about turning oppressed inhabitants into citizens. 
In a less positive interpretation, Tilly calls it a “state-led nationalism” where “rulers who spoke in a 
nation’s name successfully demanded that citizens identify themselves with that nation and 
subordinate other interests to those of the state” (Tilly 1994:133). In contrast, the borders in Eastern 
Europe were settled after the rise of nationalism, which created a strong focus on the ethnic/cultural 
dimension of nationhood. Tilly cals it “state-seeking nationalism” where “representative of some 
population that currently did not have collective control of a state claimed an autonomous political 
status, or even a separate state, on the ground that the population had a distinct, coherent cultural 
identity” (Tilly 1994:133). Kohn used the terms “Western” and “Eastern” both to denote the 
geographic locations of the various ideas of the nation (Kohn drew the line between the area west of 
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the Rhine and the areas east of the Rhine) and to denote two different ideal types of perceptions of 
nationhood.  
The seminal historical work of Kohn has been followed by an important literature about the 
conceptual and empirical soundness of this distinction and its application on contemporary nation 
states (Nielsen 1996, Hjerm 2003, Janmaat 2006, Jones, Smith 2001a, Jones, Smith 2001b, Kaufmann 
1999, Kuzio 2002a, Reeskens, Hooghe 2010, Shulman 2002, Kymlicka 2000b, e.g. Ceobanu, 
Escandell 2008). Conceptually one of the key questions has been whether the distinction should be 
used as a dichotomy, a continuum or a two dimensional space. Empirically one of the key questions 
has been, which variables actually measure “ethnic” and “civic”. The article contributes to this 
standing debate. In the first section the articles address some of the major conceptual problems with 
Kohn’s distinction. In the second section an adjusted conceptual framework is developed. In the third 
section the article applies multi-classification analysis in order to empirically establish and interpret 
a two-dimensional space of perceptions of nationhood. In the following sections the article 
demonstrates how this conceptual and methodological framework can be used to describe perceptions 
of nationhood within countries, across countries, and across time.   
 
The pitfalls of the ethnic civic distinction  
Kohn’s distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” is at the surface simple and convincing but still 
contains a number of pitfalls. Firstly, it is widely agreed that the use of the term ethnic is problematic. 
The problem is that ethnic is not easily defined and Kymlicka (2000b) rightly argues that perceptions 
of nationhood are typically formed around broader cultural markers, i.e. often it is shared norms, 
values and customs and not common ancestors that is believed to be crucial. And if common ancestors 
are believed to be crucial, it is typically because it is seen as the best guarantee for maintaining 
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common values and norms. Thus, conceptually it is difficult to keep cultural and ethnic markers apart, 
which makes Meincke’s old term “kulturnation” more precise. Kohn’s himself actually seems to be 
well aware of the social construction of ethnic; “Modern nationalities, however, are mixtures of 
different, and sometimes even very distant, races. … Few is any nationalities can at present claim 
anything approaching common descent“ (Kohn 1944:14). Therefore a first improvement is to replace 
“ethnic” with the broader term “cultural community”. The term “civic” is also somewhat problematic. 
If negatively defined as “none-ethnic/none-cultural”, the term is troubled by the fact that “ethnic” and 
“civic” elements in perceptions of nationhood can coexist (see below). If positively defined as state 
power legitimized through public participation in democratic procedures, the term gets normative 
connotations. Thus, Kohn has been accused of distinguishing between a “bad” and “good” kind of 
nationalism, which could be influenced by his own life story. Kohn was born in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (1891), prisoner of war in Russia after the First World War and ended his life as a college 
teacher in the free US. Therefore a second improvement is to replace “civic” with the broader and 
more neutral term “political community”.  
Secondly, most contemporary scholars find it useful to replace Kohn’s dichotomy with either 
1) a continuum from “civic/Western/political” at the one end to “ethnic/Eastern/cultural” at the other 
or 2) a two dimensional solution. Those in favour of a continuum often cite Anthony Smith for the 
argument in his seminal 1991 book that “… every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in 
varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other 
times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized” (Smith 1991:13). However, 
most empirical studies, this one included, find a two dimensional structure in perceptions of 
nationhood. Empirically, the “political” and “cultural” parts of perceptions of nationhood do not seem 
to be mutual exclusive phenomenon (Jones, Smith 2001a, Reeskens, Hooghe 2010, Jones, Smith 
2001b, Janmaat 2006, Kunovich 2009).  This is recognised in the previous quantitative empirical 
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studies but the interpretation is troubled by a weak conceptualization of what it means to be high/high 
or low/low on the two dimensions (though see Bonikowsky & DiMaggio on the American case). In 
the section to come, a better conceptualization will be suggested.  
Thirdly, it can naturally be questioned whether inhabitants of a given nation state share a 
common perception of nationhood or rather have a number of competing stories of nationhood. 
Especially scholars working on the American case have documented that a number of competing 
narratives about nationhood are present within the American public (Smith 2003, e.g. Bonikowski, 
DiMaggio Forthcoming). The obvious answer is that Kohn refers to the dominant perception of 
nationhood. Kohn argues that “The character of no people is fixed once and forever. Every people 
participates in the entire spiritual world of humanity and its richness; no human trait is missing in 
any people. But in different peoples different characteristics, abilities and tendencies receive a 
different emphasis. It is not the possession of definite traits which defines a people, but the tendency 
to accentuate them” (1944:30). Kohn did have some substantive arguments for expecting some 
perceptions of nationhood to dominate. He. e.g. argued that “the growth of nationalism is the process 
of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form” (1944:4). Tilly is a bit more 
specific; “states did commonly adopt programs of normative indoctrination designed to homogenize 
there subject populations and to activate there national commitments” (Tilly 1994:138). The national 
school system that promotes a standardised language and a common understanding of the history of 
the nation state are clear examples. The “program of normative indoctrination” sometimes even 
include nationwide religious schooling. Other important programmes of normative indoctrination are 
military service, ministries of culture and state financed public mass media institutions. However, 
even with such institutions in place one can find important within-country variation in perceptions of 
nationhood (see below). Furthermore, perceptions of nationhood are often formed in opposition to 
each other, i.e.  one narrative only makes senses with a counter-narrative is present. In Kohn’s own 
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work “civic” helps to define “ethnic” and the other way around. In the two-dimensional framework 
below, it will be shown have four positions help to define each other.  
 Fourthly, and most profoundly, Kohn provided a historical account connected to the 
geopolitical realities of the 18th and 19th century that might not be valid in the 20th or 21th century. 
The nature of the “birth” of a given nation state might create better opportunities for some perceptions 
of nationhood than for others. However, the real world clearly seems to have falsified any idea of a 
deterministic link between dominant perceptions of nationhood around the formation of a given 
nation state and contemporary perceptions of nationhood. Germany is a point in case. The 
archetypical “kulturnation” seems in most aspects to have become a “statenation”. In order to 
demonstrate the importance of historical legacies, one can point to legislation such as the right for 
ethnic Germans living centuries in other countries to claim citizenship in Germany (e.g. Koopmans 
2005: 37) However, the law was abolished in 1993 and Joopke’s study of citizenship policy indicated 
a general shift to “civicness” in Western countries (2005). Kohn’s other archetypical Eastern nation 
states also undergo profound changes after the break down of the Soviet Union (e.g. Ceobanu, 
Escandell 2008, Shulman 2002, Kuzio 2002b). Using the ISSP data material from 1995, including 15 
countries, Shulman (2002) concluded that the covered Eastern European countries were much more 
“civic” than expected. Schulman did not have data over time and did warn about making firm 
conclusion based on a single cross-cut. But the available empirical evidence led to the argument that 
the Eastern countries might have overcome their “ethnic” nationalism of the past. Such a development 
would support the “optimistic” argument that modernization, i.e. economic development and 
democratization, has a capacity to replace “ethnic” with “civic” nationalism (but see empirical results 
below). In contrast to the optimism on behalf of the Eastern European countries, it has been feared 
that the rise of new-right-wing parties such as Front National in France indicate a shift towards more 
“ethnic” nationhood perceptions in Western Europe. While there is a large literature on public 
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attitudes toward migration and migrants, especially in Western Europe, little is known about changes 
in the more fundamental perceptions of nationhood. Bail’s work on migration experiences and 
perceptions of nationhood is an exception (Bail 2008). However, Bail did not describe changes over 
time and his inductive country-classification based on fuzzy-set analyses did not relate to the 
conceptual discussions about “ethnic” and “civic”. This article suggests a different classification of 
countries, which is rooted in established conceptual positions and enables comparisons across time.  
 
Re-conceptualizing a two-dimensional framework  
If the cultural and political content of perceptions of nationhood is threated as two distinct 
dimensions, also conceptually, one derives at four positions, which can be given a theoretical 
interpretation. This eases the interpretation of empirical results as it enables us to see the combinations 
as more than blurred mixes of “ethnic” and “civic”. The positions are shown in Figure 1. In the upper 
left quadrant, one finds the classic republican ideas associated with the thinking of Rousseau (1718-
1778) and Kohn’s notion of “civic” (and not “ethnic”). The basic idea is that the nation is formed 
around a political democratic community and not a cultural community. The French revolution in 
1789 is used as the classic example of a nation defined primarily by the democratic nature of the state, 
a “staatsnation”. Everybody that adhered to the slogan of “liberty, equality and fraternity” was 
imagined to belong to the new French nation. In contemporary thinking, Habermas (1997) is a 
prominent defender of this republican position. In relation to the reunification of East and West 
Germany, Habermas (1997) e.g. argued that a common national identity should be structured around 
”verfassungspatriotismus” (constitutional patriotism) and not around (imagined) shared cultural 
content. In relation to the current debate about immigration, especially in Western Europe, the classic 
republican idea is that migrants should assimilate to the existing national democratic political 
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community (Tilly would say the state) but not to an existing national cultural community ( McGarry, 
O'leary 2013).  
 
Figure 1. Two dimensions of national perception and four classic positions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
In the lower right quadrant, one finds the classic national conservatism associated with the thinking 
of Herder (1744-1818) and Kohn’s notion of “ethnic” (and not “civic”). The unification of Germany 
in 1871 is used as the classic example of perceptions of nationhood with a strong focus on the cultural 
community; a “kulturnation”. Herder claimed that a nation should be formed around a common 
cultural community (or “Volkgeist”) and not a political community, in opposition to the French 
revolution and the inclusion of German speaking territories in the French republic. Herder himself 
travelled the German speaking regions and published letters and collected folk songs that 
demonstrated and promoted the shared cultural content. The new ideas of nationalism emphasised the 
shared cultural content of the “German” principalities as the borders were unclear and as no 
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cultural community 
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”National liberalism” 
”National conservatism” 
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democracy was installed,  (e.g. Brubaker 1992). For national conservatives, the nation is not an 
imagined community (in contrast to the point of departure for this article). It is a historical given 
cultural community on which the political rule rests. Therefore immigration from cultural distant 
areas is easily seen as a challenge for upholding a nation. This is the basic national conservative idea 
that many contemporary new-right-wing parties share (Kitschelt, McGann 1997). What to do with 
already present immigrations is not easily answered within national conservatism. One solution is full 
cultural assimilation but the classic answer is segregation (McGarry, O'leary 2013).  
In the upper right quadrant, one finds what can be labelled national liberalism often associated 
with the thinking of Mazzini (1805-1872) and his fight for a united Italian nation state. As many of 
the “Italian” regions were “occupied” by the Austrian Kingdom, Mazzini promoted the idea that due 
to a shared cultural content, the Italians had a right to establish their own political community. It was 
both an opposition to the rule of kings (in contrast to the German case) and to the borders of the state 
(in contrast to French case). The national liberal position include both a political and cultural 
dimension of nationhood. The US is the most classic example of national liberal nation state building. 
The Americans were reluctant to surrender themselves to the state, as demanded by the French 
republicanism, and it was hard to imagine the shared cultural content found in the national 
conservative perceptions of nationhood. The notion of an American melting pot is according to 
Kymlicka, a clear example of this simultaneous presence of both a political and cultural dimension 
in the nation building project (with Canada as the neighbouring contrasting, more multicultural, case) 
(2000a). Positively defined national liberal nation building is often focused on finding procedures to 
legitimise a new limited state and ways to invent new shared cultural content. Within national liberal 
thinking, migration flows are not seen as problematic as in the thinking of national conservatives. But 
still there is a cultural community that needs to be formed in the future. Migrants are not asked to 
assimilate to the old state or the old authentic culture. However, migrants are asked to be willing to 
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assimilate into the state and nation that are to come (McGarry, O'leary 2013). Thus, national 
liberalism tends to be forward looking but with a demand for future assimilation.   
  Finally, there is the lower left quadrant, which Kohn’s distinction totally neglected. One 
should expect such narratives to be exceptions to the rule as they are exposed to strong forces from 
“above”, e.g. the school systems as discussed by Tilly (1994), and from “below”, e.g. the human need 
to feel belonging and create meaning in secularised and urbanised modernity discussed by Anderson 
(1991). However, nationalism, in any form, has always had its critics. Following the logic of Figure 
1, this position neither finds the national cultural or the national democratic political community of 
importance. Intellectually such a deconstruction of the national has some of its strongest roots in 
socialism, where the bourgeois nation states (including their liberal democracies) basically is a tool 
to control the working classes. The idea of a world revolution and unification of working classes 
across countries does not have much influence among contemporary publics. However, a critical 
perspective on nationalism can be found in various other contemporary versions. Firstly, there are 
(still) states where large segments dream about an alternative nation state project; in the ISSP sample 
e.g. represented by Spain, Israel and Turkey. Secondly, there are states where dominant national 
conservative perceptions of nationhood is counterweighted with an opposition that question the very 
notion of nationalism (see below). Thirdly, a general deconstruction of nationalism is intellectually 
pushed forward by what Böss labels radical multiculturalists (2006). The radical multiculturalists 
reject the basic idea that some people have a special privilege to a certain territory. They also question 
the idea of a national cultural and political community. Parekh (2002) e.g. sees liberal democracy as 
a Western value that oppresses authentic local cultures. This maintenance of authentic cultures bears 
a resemblance to the segregation suggested by hard core national conservatives. The article uses the 
term “de-constructivism” as the uniting factor in this quadrant and it will be demonstrated that this 
position is not empirically irrelevant. 
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How to measure perceptions of nationhood? 
The majority of cross-national empirical studies of the “ethnic-civic” distinction have used the ISSP-
module on national identity (International Social  Survey Program, www.issp.org). This is for good 
reasons as it is the most comprehensive dataset on perceptions of nationhood. The module was fielded 
in 23 nation states in 1995, 33 in 2003 and 33 in 2013. In each nation state a representative sample of 
adult (18 years old and above) have been asked a common set of standard survey items. Most 
studiesuse the seven ISSP-items where respondents are asked what it means to be truly American, 
Russian, Dutch etc. The argument is that the criteria used to construct the (imagined) boundary 
between those inside and outside the nation are pivotal for the underlying perceptions of nationhood. 
This approach follows what has been labelled the “boom in boundary studies” within sociology 
(Wimmer 2008). The specific ISSP question had the following introduction “Some people say that 
the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. 
How important do you think each of the following is…”. The respondent was then asked about: 
 
1) to have been born in [country]. 
 
2) to have [country] citizenship. 
 
3) to have lived in [country] for most of one's life. 
 
4) to be able to speak [country  language]. 
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5) to be a [dominant religion]. 
 
6) to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws.  
7) to feel [country  nationality].  
 
Part of the inconclusiveness of the previous studies is caused by a confusion about which of these 
items respectively measure “political community / civic / Western” and “cultural community /ethnic 
/ Eastern”. One solution is to choose indicators deductively. Schulman (2002) e.g. choose “born” (1), 
“citizenship” (2), “lived” (3), “laws” (6) and “feel” (7) to reflect “civic” and “language” (4) and 
“religion” (5) to reflect “ethnic”. Another approach is to inductively look for dimensions in the 
responses of citizens. Here previous studies of the 1995 data derives at a two dimensional solution, 
where “born” (1), citizenship” (2), “lived”(3) and “religion” (5) form the first dimension and  laws” 
(6), “feel” (7) and “language” (4) forms the second dimension (Jones, Smith 2001a, Jones, Smith 
2001b). Previous studies of the 2003 data derives at a similar solution for the second dimension and 
a close to similar solution for the first dimension (though “citizenship” is left out of the first dimension 
and an additional item added in 2003 about ancestry was included) (Reeskens, Hooghe 2010: 589). 
The interpretation of these dimensions differs. Reeskens and Hooghe use the label “ethnic” 
(dimension 1) and “civic” (dimension 2), whereas Jones & Smith argue that the dimensions cut across 
the “civic-ethnic” divide (they especially find it problematic to include “language” (4) in “civic” and 
“citizenship” (2) in “ethnic”). Thus, in a review Janmart rightly argue that “a number of items… could 
have been interpreted differently by the respondents, which makes it difficult to assign meaning to 
underlying dimensions in the data” (Janmaat 2006:58). Furthermore, the interpretation is (perceived 
to be) troubled by the fact that it has proved difficult to find a relationship between the “ethnic-
dimension” and negative attitudes to migration/migrants and between the “civic-dimension” and 
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these attitudes and positive attitudes (Janmaat 2006). It has also proved difficult to link proudness 
measures (also measured in the ISSP-survey), the boundary measures and  xenophobic attitudes more 
broadly (e.g. Hjerm 2003). All in all this leaves an uncertainty about the interpretation, which e.g. 
leads Ceobanu & Escandell (2008) to replace the ethnic-civic distinction with four alternative 
dimensions, Jannmaat (2006) to supplement the ISSP data with Eurobarometer data, Bail to apply 
fuzzy-set techniques (2008) and Wrigth to test alternative rank order measures to distinguish “ethnic” 
and “civic” elements the perceptions of nationhood among Americans (2011) .   
 This article contributes with a better interpretation of the two-dimensional that has been found 
in the previous studies of the ISSP-data. It does so by means of multiple correspondence analyses 
(MCA), which is part of the broader methodology labelled geometric data analyses (Le Roux, 
Rouanet 2004). The article uses the MCA COREM procedure in SPAD (version 7.3). The method 
was most famously applied in Bourdieu’s “The distinction” and the article shares the premise that 
human thinking often take place in a field or social space where positions are contrasted against each 
other (Bourdieu 1986, see also Le Roux et al. 2007). The de-constructivist position in Figure 1 is 
clearly negatively defined as an opposition to narratives about nationhood. The national conservative 
ideas were developed in an opposition to republican ideas and other ways around. The national liberal 
ideas develop in opposition to both republicanism and national conservatism. The basic point is that 
thinking about nationhood is none in context of competing narratives. This is the case both in the 
historical process of nation state formation and in contemporary public discussions fueled by 
increased immigration. 
The article makes use of the full ISSP dataset on national identity except South Africa in 2013 
(due to a difference in response category of the used items) and the sample of Palestinian citizens in 
Israel (due to their exclusion from citizenship in practise). Thus the Israeli sample only contains the 
non-Palestinian population. Furthermore, in all countries the article only uses the answers from 
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respondents where both parents had citizenship in the country. Thus, it is a description of how “the 
natives” imagine the national community. The ISSP data are not suitable to describe the national 
perceptions of the “migrants” due to high drop- out rates and self-selection of the most assimilated 
migrants. The ISSP provides data from 44 countries. 14 countries conducted the national identity 
model in all three waves, 16 countries conducted two waves and 14 countries conducted one wave. 
Thus, in all the data include 88 national samples including in all 104,605 respondents (see online 
appendix Table A2 for sample sizes and see www.issp.org for more information). The ISSP data is 
not a random sample of countries around the world.  There is an overrepresentation of European 
countries, which is of importance for the inferences that can be made from the data material. However, 
the European countries are of special interest as they were the point of departure for Kohn’s historical 
work and the strand of literature that followed (see Bail 2008 for a good overview of the many 
previous focused comparisons between a few European countries).  
 In the MCA-analysis the so-called active variables are the seven items listed above. The 
respondents could answer the seven questions using the following categories “very important”, “fairly 
important”, “not very important”, “not important at all” and “can’t choose”. The answers are recoded 
into “very/fairly important” (marked by a “+” in Figure 2) and “not very/not all important” (marked 
by – in Figure 2). i This grouping was done in order to avoid categories with few answers.  Thus the 
“field” includes 14 answer categories or so-called modalities. The share answering “very/fairly 
important” in each country sample is found in online appendix Table A1. The two dimensional space 
derived from the included active variables is found in Figure 2. This is the so-called cloud of 
modalities. The eigenvalue of the first dimension is 0.34 (x-axis) and the eigenvalue of the second is 
0.15 (y-axis). As found in previous studies, a two-dimensional structure is present in the publics.  
“Born” (1) and “lived” (3) deliver the highest contribution (cumulated contribution at 20.3 for each) 
to the formation of the first dimension (later interpreted as the “cultural community dimension”).ii  
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“Law” (6) delivers the highest contribution (45.5) to the formation of the second dimension (later 
interpreted as the “political community dimension).iii Thus, the MCA-analysis largely replicates what 
is found with other techniques in previous studies (close to identical to the solution with six 
multidimensional indicators provided by Kunovich 2009:580).  
One of the advantages of MCA is the possibility to easily add so-called supplementary 
variables. These variables do not actively shape the constructed space but the position of the answer 
categories ease the interpretation of the dimensions. The added additional variables are importance 
of family background (item added in 2003), feeling of national belonging, feeling of proudness about 
the nation, attitudes to the size of migration, attitudes to whether migrants should assimilate and 
preference for given priority to national programs and films in TV, se online appendix Table A3 for 
exact wording of the included supplementary variables.  The interpretation of the derived MCA space 
is conducted in the following section five and six.  
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Figure 2. Two dimensional space. Position of 14 modalities of active variables  
 
 
 
The overview comparative data can provide comes at the costs of country details. The solution in 
Figure 2 is an “average” based on the full data material. The method is based on the bold assumption 
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that survey items carry the same meaning across countries and across time, as in all kind of 
comparative survey research.iv The large advantage is the ability to classify and compare countries in 
a systematic manner; though the article will be sensitive to potential deviant cases primarily found in 
the de-constructivist quadrant (see interpretation in section seven). The estimated exact position of 
each country can be found in online appendix Table A2.   
 
The interpretation of the two dimensions of perceptions of nationhood 
The conceptual framework outlined in Figure 1 is useful for the interpreting of the MCA cloud of 
modalities shown in Figure 2. The national conservatives located in the lower right quadrant find it 
important to belong to the dominant religion in the country, to have been born in the country and to 
have lived most of one’s life in the country in order to be “really” French, American, Turkish etc. 
The MCA-analysis locates 34 per cent of the respondents in the dataset in this quadrant. The 
republicans distinguish themselves by taking more or less the opposite position. They find it 
unimportant to have been born in the country, to have lived most of one’s life in the country and to 
belong to the dominant religion. The MCA-analysis locates 24 per cent of all respondents in this 
quadrant. Finding citizenship important is located at the border between national liberals and national 
conservatives.v The national liberals distinguish themselves by finding it important that members 
respect the law, speak the language, and feel national. The MCA-analyse locates 25 per cent of all 
respondents in this quadrant. Finally, the de-constructivists distinguish themselves by finding it 
unimportant to be able to speak the language or feel national. The MCA-analyses locates 18 per cent 
of all respondents in this quadrant. These positions give conceptual meaning and will be further 
explored by means of the respondents answers on the supplementary variables (see Figure 3).   
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Figure 3. Two dimensional space. Position of supplementary variables
 
Figure 3 shows how those given a particular answer, e.g. those answering “very proud” of their 
national identity, on average are located in the established space (axes values are changed in order to 
make the figure more readable). As expected those answering “very proud” of the national identity 
are on average located in the national conservative quadrant. Those in the national conservative 
quadrant also tend to answer that migration should be “decreased a lot”. They also tend to agree in 
the statement that national television should give preference to national films and programs. Finally, 
they find it important to have family background in the country in order to be a real member. The 
national liberals tend to answer that they feel “very close” to the country and that migration should 
“decrease a little”. They also distinguish themselves by answering that “it is better if groups adapt 
and blend into the larger society”. Thus, the national liberal emphasis on assimilation goes hand in 
hand with a preference for not receiving more migrants than the nation can successfully assimilate 
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into the future both cultural and political community, i.e. the amount that can become “real” members 
by coming to speak the language, feel national and feel close to the nation.  
 The republicans tend to answer that they are “somewhat” proud of the nation (not “very 
proud” as the national conservatives) and feel “close” to the nation (not “very close” as that national 
liberals). As expected the republicans tend to disagree with the statement that national TV stations 
should give priority to national programs and they find family background to be unimportant for being 
a real member. Finally, the republicans answer, on average, that immigration should “remain the 
same” or “increase a little”. As the (imagined) necessary assimilation is not as profound as the one 
imagined by national liberals, the republicans are not as worried about the amount of migrants. 
Finally, the de-constructivists distinguish themselves by being “not proud at all” or “not very proud” 
of their nationality. Many also answer that they do not feel “close at all” or “not very close” to the 
nation. They also distinguish themselves by answering that migration should be “increased a lot” and 
that it is better for a society “if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions” (in contrast to 
the position of the national liberals). Thus, one can find empirical evidence of some coherence in the 
de-constructivist position despite the critique of nationalism comes in many forms.   
 These patterns in the answers of the 104,605 respondents indicate that the four perceptions of 
nationhood outlined in Figure 1 are relevant in contemporary nation states, at least on average. The 
MCA-analysis is developed to find and inductively interpret such segments by means of 
supplementary variables. The MCA-analysis demonstrates the present of a fairly coherent logic 
behind the criteria for being a real national and the feeling of belonging, the feeling of proudness, the 
attitudes to national TV, the attitudes to the size of migration and the attitudes to the assimilation of 
migrations, which has been difficult to establish in previous empirical studies. The MCA-analysis 
operates with an underlying logic of non-linearity, which ease interpretation. Segments scoring low 
on the political dimension might be against migration (as expected by previous research). This is 
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correct for the national conservatives. However, they might also be those most in favour of migration. 
This is the case of the de-constructivists. Thus, the absence of a linear relationship between the “civic” 
dimension and xenophobic attitudes is actually to be expected. The same is the case for those scoring 
low or high on the cultural dimension. This position can both include national liberalists and hardcore 
national conservatives. Thus, one can question the assumption of linearity in (simple) regression 
techniques, which makes MCA a better methodological choice.       
 
The within-country-variation in perceptions of nationhood 
The largest pitfall in the application of Kohn’s framework is the tendency to neglect the within 
country-variation in stories of perceptions of nationhood. It is embedded in the MCA-logic that 
positions need to be interpreted in a relational manner. The MCA-solution is well-suited to show the 
variation in perceptions of nationhood within countries. Figure 4 show the variation in four countries, 
which below will be labelled some of the most stable respectively republican, national liberal, 
national conservative and de-constructivist countries. The chosen countries are Sweden (2013), the 
US (2013), Japan (2013) and Bulgaria (1995). The latter is chosen due to lack of voting information 
in the other countries with a stable overrepresentation of national conservatives, such as the 
Philippines and Poland (and Bulgaria in 2003). The selection of these four countries could be called 
a best case for low within country variation. The amount of variation is shown by the average position 
of the voters of major parties (four per cent or above in the last general election, based on the sample), 
see Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Position of voters of major parties within Sweden (2013), the US (2013), Japan (2013) 
and Bulgaria (1995) in two dimensional space 
 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates that variations in perceptions of nationhood can be found in these best cases 
for low within country variation. The American two-party system does not allow for much variation 
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but still there was a difference in the average positioning of the Democratic voters (voted for Obama 
in 2012) and the Republican voters (voted for Romney in 2012). Both voter groups do on average 
find the political community important but the Republican voters found the cultural community of 
higher importance than did the Democratic voters. The location close to the centre indicates that 
voters of the two parties include a mix of de-constructivists, republicans, national liberals and national 
conservatives (see Bonikowski, DiMaggio Forthcoming, for a more detailed account of the within 
country variation in the US). Nevertheless, by international standard there is a stronger emphasis on 
national liberal perceptions of nationhood in the US than in most other countries (see below). The 
multiparty system in the three other countries allows for more variation across voters of different 
political parties. In Sweden the voters of the Green party and the Left party are more republican than 
the voters of the Swedish Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic party. However, by 
international standards all of the seven so-called mainstream Swedish parties have an electorate with 
a clear overrepresentation of republicans. The electorate of the Swedish democrats, the new right-
wing party, is clearly more national conservative than the electorate of the mainstream Swedish 
parties. But by international standards the electorate of the Swedish new-right wing party are on 
average more national liberal than national conservative.  Within country variation can also be found 
in Japan (2012 election) and Bulgaria (election 1995). In Japan, the tension was between the “de-
constructivist” voters of the communist party, the more republican voters of the Democratic party and 
the more national conservative voters of the Restoration party and New Komito. In Bulgaria, the 
tension was between the national conservative voters of the Bulgarian communist party and the more 
republican voter of the Movement for rights and Freedoms.   
 In all the sampled countries there will be republicans, national conservatives, national liberals 
and de-constructivists and these perceptions of nationhood can be tied to very different ideologies 
about redistribution. Figure 4 demonstrates how e.g. socialism both can be connected to national 
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conservatism as in Bulgaria (1995), de-constructivism as in Japan (2013) and republicanism as in 
Sweden (2013). Whether one should study this within-country-variation or the between country 
variation cannot be given an easy answer. It will depend on research interest. However, the large 
strength of the ISSP-data is the ability to study the between country variation, which was at the centre 
of Kohn’s historical analyses. Therefore the next section describes the average position of the publics 
included in the ISSP-survey. If there is any merit in Kohn’s comparative approach, one should as a 
minimum expect across-country-variation.  
 
The cross-country-variation in perceptions of nationhood  
The ISSP data clearly indicate across-country-variation. Figure 5 shows the (average) position of the 
country in the latest available sample. In the republican quadrant one largely finds the Northern 
European countries. As expected from a historical account, France is found in the republican 
quadrant. France, however, is by 2013 not the country with the most republican public. The two 
countries with the most clear-cut republican publics are Sweden (2013) and the Netherlands (2003). 
In accordance with Kohn’s historical division, one also finds Denmark (2013), Switzerland (2013) 
and Belgium (2013) in the republican quadrant. In conflict with Kohn’s division, Germany (2013), 
Estonia (2013) and Slovenia (2013) and Taiwan (2013) are also found in this quadrant. Norway 
(2013), Finland (2013) and Iceland (2013) are Western countries but their borders were settled late 
in history. Thus, one could also perceive these cases as deviant if Kohn’s historical distinction is 
applied in a deterministic manner.    
 In accordance with Kohn’s historical division, one finds most of the none-Western countries 
in the national conservative quadrant. East European countries such as Poland (2003), Slovakia 
(2013), Bulgaria (2003), Hungary (2013), Czech republic (2013), Lithuania (2013) together with 
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neighbouring Russia (2013) and Georgia (2013) are located here. So is Austria (2003) and Italy 
(1995). In accordance with Kohn, one also finds countries with late settled state borders such as the 
Philippines (2013), Venezuela (2003), India (2013), Turkey (2013), Mexico (2013), Uruguay (2003), 
Chile (2003), South Korea (2013) and South Africa (2003) in the national conservative quadrant. The 
latter, South Africa, is positioned as the country with the most clear-cut national conservative public 
by 2003. The only country in the quadrant in conflict with Kohn’s historical division is New Zealand 
(2003). However, New Zealand is positioned close to the centre, which indicate a fairly equal 
distribution of republicans, national liberals, national conservatives and de-constructivists in the 
country.  
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Figure 5. Latest available position of country in two dimensional space. N=44  
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Finally, one finds the positions of countries that cannot easily be handled by Kohn’s dichotomy. In 
the national liberal quadrant, one finds the settler societies such as Australia (2003), the US (2013) 
and Canada (2003) together with Portugal (2013) and Latvia (2013). UK (2013) is located at the 
border between the national conservative and national liberal quadrant. The location near the centre 
indicates that most of these countries have large groups adhering to one of the other three perceptions 
of nationhood. Nevertheless, it fits the historical account that the national liberals are overrepresented 
in settler societies. The de-constructivist quadrant can neither be handled by Kohn’s dichotomy. In 
Ireland (2013), Israel (2013), Croatia (2013), Spain (2013) and Japan (2013) there is an 
overrepresentation of de-constructivists. Spain is a well-known case of a countries troubled by 
separatist movements and a number of ad hoc explanations can be used to interpret the positions of 
the other countries in this quadrant, e.g. Ireland, which stands out as the country with the most de-
constructivist public (see next section).  
 The main conclusion of these empirical findings is not that Kohn’s historical account for the 
birth of nations has a predictive power. In the next section it will be demonstrated that countries are 
by no means locked into a fixed position. On the contrary, large changes can be found over time. The 
main contribution is that the established conceptual framework and the applied MCA-method enables 
a meaningful classification that allows cross-country comparisons.  
 
The changes in country position over the last two decades  
The repeated collection of ISSP data makes is possible to describe changed over time in large number 
of countries, which to our knowledge have not be exploited before. The country-trajectories from 
1995 to 2013 are shown in Figure 6 and those from either 1995 to 2003 or from 2003 to 2013 are 
shown in Figure 7. It is not the aim of the article to explain these time trends in any detail. However, 
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a simply description of changes can provide an important base for judging the soundness of the 
assumed historical stability sometimes assigned to Kohn’s distinction.  
 
Figure 6. Country trajectories from 1995 to 2013. N= 15 (end point marked full) 
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TW-Taiwan, HR-Croatia, CZ-Czech Republic, 'DK-Denmark, EE-Estonia, FI-Finland, FR-France, GE-Georgia, DE-
Germany, HU-Hungary, IS-Iceland, IN-India, IE-Ireland, IL-Israel, JP-Japan, KR-Korea (South), LV-Latvia, LT-
Lithuania, MX-Mexico, BE13-Belgium, NO-Norway, PH-Philippines, PT-Portugal, RU-Russia, SK-Slovak Republic, 
SI-Slovenia, ES-Spain, SE-Sweden, CH-Switzerland, TR-Turkey, GB-Great Britain, US-United States, I- Italy, AU 
Australia, PL Poland, BG Bulgaria, CA Canada, NL Netherlands, NZ New Zealand, AT Austria, CL Chile, VE Venezuela, 
ZA South Africa, UY Uruguay. 
 
Of the 13 countries located in the republican quadrant in Figure 5, the ISSP data enables us to trace 
ten countries across time. Three of the four countries can be traced from 1995 to 2013 (see Figure 6), 
Sweden, Norway and Germany, were placed in the quadrant in all three waves; Norway and German 
with very similar positions, whereas Sweden became even more republican. Slovenia was located 
directly at the border between the republican and national liberal quadrant in 1995 and moves towards 
republicanism. Five of the six countries in the republican quadrant in Figure 5 that can be traced over 
two waves (see Figure 7) were also earlier positioned in this quadrant. That goes for the Netherlands, 
Denmark, France, Switzerland and Finland. Thus, despite the rise of new-right wing parties in all of 
these countries and worries about immigration, it has not fundamentally changed perceptions of 
nationhood. Finally, Taiwan (2013) entered the republican quadrant from a position at the border of 
the de-constructivist quadrant (2003). 
 Of the 21 countries located in the national conservative quadrant in Figure 5, the ISSP data 
enables us to trace 11 cases back in time. Of the six countries that can be traced from 1995 to 2013 
(see Figure 6) only the Philippines were found in the quadrant in 1995. Russia derived from a de-
constructivist position in 1995. The same did Hungary. The Czech and Slovak republics arrived from 
a republican position in 1995; the latter with an overrepresentation of de-constructivists in 2003. 
Thus, the data indicate a movement (back) towards national conservatism rather than a fixed of 
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overrepresentation of national conservatives in Eastern Europe. The UK experienced a move towards 
national liberalism but is positioned close to the middle. For the five countries that can be traced over 
two waves (see Figure 7) Bulgaria and Poland had in both samples an overrepresentation of national 
conservative; Poland with a move towards even more national conservatism. New Zealand arrived 
from a republican position in 1995 and Austria arrived from a national liberal position in 1995. Thus, 
these two countries experienced a move towards national conservatism though the position close to 
the middle should be kept in mind. Finally, South Korea arrived from a position at the border of de-
constructivism in 2003.  Thus, the move towards an overrepresentation of national conservatives are 
not exclusively an Eastern European phenomenon.  
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Figure 7. Country trajectories from 1995 to 2003 and between 2003 to 2013. N=15 (end point marked 
full) 
 
See Figure 6 for country labels.  
 
    
The five countries located in the national liberal quadrant in Figure 5 can all be traced back in time. 
Only the US was found in this quadrant in all three samples. Thus, the US is the most clear-cut 
example of having a public with an overrepresentation of national liberals. Latvia was in the quadrant 
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in 1995 but not in 2003. Australia (2003) and Canada (1995) arrived from a position in the republican 
quadrant in in 1995. Finally, Portugal (2013) arrived from a position in the national conservative 
quadrant (2003).  Especially, the changes in perceptions of nationhood among Canadians are 
remarkable. In 1995, Canada had on overrepresentation of republicans, which positioned the country 
together with the Netherlands and Sweden; the three countries that have experimented the most with 
so-called “multicultural policies”(Koopmans 2005). In 1995, 52 per cent of Canadians found it 
important to have been born in the country, 55 per cent found it important to have lived most of one’s 
life in Canada and 26 found it important have be Christian. In 2003 the shares had increased to 82 per 
cent, 83 per cent and 54 per cent (see Appendix Table A1). This Canadian retreat from republicanism 
(not multiculturalism) is also described in national studies. Wong & Guo describe how the Canadian 
multicultural policies of the 1990s were “civic”, whereas those of the 2000s were more “integrative” 
(2015:4). 
 Of the five countries located in the de-constructivist quadrant in Figure 5, four can be traced 
back in time. Japan and Ireland do in all three waves (see Figure 6) have an overrepresentation of de-
constructivists; but the latter with a change towards more de-constructivism. Spain (2013) is located 
closer to the middle, i.e. the overrepresentation of de-constructivists is not as pronounced. Israel can 
be traced from 2003 to 2013 (see Figure 7), which documents a change from an overrepresentation 
of national conservatism to an overrepresentation of de-constructivism.  It is not an anomaly that 
countries have a number of citizens located in the de-constructivist quadrant. However, as discussed 
in the introduction, it is somewhat surprising to find an overrepresentation in this quadrant. The 
Spanish case it not so surprising due to the well-known wish for separation of a significant part of the 
public. The Irish case is more challenging. One of the explanations is that the Irish, in general, give 
little importance to being able to speak Irish. Only around four out of ten answer that it is important 
to be really Irish. This is the lowest share in whole sample (see Appendix Table A1). The obvious 
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reason is that English, the language of the former occupying power, de facto is the most used language 
in the country. The Irish move towards more de-constructivism, however, is primarily caused by less 
importance given to being a Catholic. The share declined from 55 per cent in 1995 to 33 per cent in 
2013. One ad hoc explanation could be the negative experiences with the religious conflict in 
Northern Ireland and the “normalization” after the peace agreement established in 1998. The Israeli 
case, known for widespread national conservatism, is also challenging. One of the reasons for the 
positioning in de-constructivist quadrant is that Israelis indicate moderate importance to being born 
in country, at least compared to countries located in the national conservative quadrant. 67 per cent 
and 57 per cent of Israeli found it important respectively in 2013 and 2003 (see Appendix Table A1). 
The obvious explanation is that Israel has a very special history, where bringing bearer of the Jewish 
culture around the world back to Israel is part of the national conservative narrative of nationhood. 
The shift to more de-constructivism indicated by the ISSP-data, however, is caused by lower 
importance given to all seven criteria. It could reflect the wide discussion about the Gaza-
disengagement plan of 2004 and the mobilization for the plan lead by Arial Sharon and Simon Peres 
within Karima. The Croatian case cannot be traced back in time but the overrepresentation of de-
constructivists in 1995, in a country known for national conservatism, is challenging. The positioning 
is caused by the little importance given to been born in Croatia and having lived most of the life in 
Croatia (see appendix Table A1). The obvious explanation is that the war that followed after the break 
of Yugoslavia made these criteria of less importance for national conservatism. As in Israel, the idea 
of making a state for those belonging to the nation outside the state was prominent in this national 
conservative thinking in Croatia. 
 Finally, the stable overrepresentation of de-constructivists in Japan could be seen as the most 
puzzling finding of the study. Japan is an extremely ethnic homogeneous country with a long 
intellectual tradition for studying, and even promoting, the authentic Japanese culture, the so-called 
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“nihonjinron” (Burgess 2007, Yoshino 1992, Befu 2001). One explanation for the positioning in the 
de-constructivist quadrant is the little importance given to religion. Only around one quarter found it 
important to believe in Buddhism or Shintoism in order to be real Japanese, see appendix Table A1. 
Another ad hoc explanation is that the historical experience with national conservatism combined 
with well-established contemporary national conservatism generates a stable opposition to the very 
idea of nationalism, e.g. symbolically reflected in the absence of a national army and the absence the 
national hymn at sport event. vi  
     
 Conclusion 
The article has been an attempt to revitalize one of the most enduring distinctions within studies of 
nationalism. Despite all the pitfalls of Kohn’s distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” nationalism, 
the article argues that it points to some very basic insights, which continue to be of relevance for 
contemporary analyses of perceptions of nationhood. When narratives about nationhood are 
constructed, the rulers and the ruled continue to rely on identities that can be connected to the political 
community around the governing of the state and/or identities that can be connected to cultural 
communities around shared language, religion, food, arts etc. Conceptually, the article contributed 
with a clarification of the position labelled national liberalism, which is common in settler societies. 
Conceptually, the article also contributed with a clarification of the position labelled de-
constructivism. This rejection of nationalism is linked to feelings of not belonging to the nation and 
to acceptance of high levels of immigration. In all countries, there are individuals, who for various 
reasons reject republican, national liberal and national conservative narratives about nationhood. To 
have an overrepresentation of de-constructivists in a public is rare and exceptions such as Ireland, 
Japan, Croatia and Israel can partly be explained by country-specific circumstances. Nevertheless, 
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the de-constructivist position is not irrelevant. Within countries, opposition to different version of de-
constructist thinking helps to define the other narratives of nationhood. Furthermore, in the case of 
large separatist movements, as in Spain, or in the aftermath of strong national conservative 
movements, as in Japan and Israel, various versions of de-constructivsm can occasionally become an 
important narrative.  
 The article has done it best not to formulate any kind of deterministic link between “the birth” 
of nation states and contemporary perceptions of nationhood. There were examples of countries such 
as Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark with a stable overrepresentation of republicans 
within the last two decades. There were also examples, such as Polen and Bulgaria, with a stable 
overrepresentation of national conservatives within the last two decades. However, one of the main 
empirical findings was large changes in perceptions of nationhood across time. Many of these changes 
occurred in Eastern European countries, which after the breakdown of the Soviet Union struggle to 
develop new and stable perceptions of nationhood. There are clear indications of an “ethnic” backlash 
in countries such as Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.  However, changes can also occur in 
more stable nation states such as Canada, which went from having an overrepresentation of 
republicans to national liberals.  
The article has made no attempt to systematically explain changes over time. This is left to 
future studies using other methods. However, it is clear from the simple descriptive results that it will 
be hard to find any overreaching logic in the time trends. This points to the relevance of detailed 
national studies rather than regressions on large pooled datasets.  
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End notes 
i “Can’t choose” are treated as missing (list wise deleted). 
ii The cumulated contributions for the other variables to the first dimensions are ”citizenship”, 19.1, “fell”, 
13.1, “religion”, 10.7, “language”, 10.5 and “law”, 6.0.  
iiiiii The cumulated contributions for the other variables to the second dimensions are “born”, 16.8, 
“language”, 13.4, “fell”, 10.4, “religion”, 8.6, “lived”, 5.1 and  ”citizenship”, 0.2.  
iv  A single of the previous studies did empirically study the assumption of homogeneity  of dimensions 
(Reeskens, Hooghe 2010). Using confirmatory factor analysis it found a presence of somewhat deviant cases 
(religion e.g. having larger impact on the “ethnic” dimension in Israel). In contrast to confirmatory factor 
analysis, the MCA analysis does not have tests for homogeneity in dimensions. However, the two dimensional 
solution for each sample has been inspected and they largely conform to the “average solution” found in Figure 
2.  
v That republicans apparently find citizenship of little importance has been discussed as a potential anomaly 
in previous studies. Conceptually, it is indeed an anomaly. A possible explanation is that republicans often 
think citizenship should be easy to obtain, which makes it less relevant when the ISSP questions asked about 
what it means e.g. to be “really” French etc. That national liberalism finds citizenship important is easier to 
understand as often in settler societies is celebrated as an important step in the nation building project. In any 
case it is important, the “citizenship” is not the main variable structuring the first dimension. As argued in 
the text the two most importance variable for the x-axis are “lived” and “born”.  
vi Another interpretation would be that the ISSP items simply do not capture the special Japanese national 
conservatism. The argument could be that it is so strong that it takes more than being born in the country to 
be really Japanese. However, even on item about ancestors, added in 2003, the Japanese seem moderate.  In 
2013, 63 per cent found in important to have Japanese ancestors, which is around the average of 64 per cent 
in the whole sample. 
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Table A1: Share answering that the criteria is “very important” or “fairly important for being a real 
national (active variables in MCA-analyses) 
 …to have 
been born 
in 
[country] 
… to have 
[country] 
citizenship 
…  to 
have lived 
in 
[country] 
for most 
of one's 
life 
… to be 
able to 
speak 
[country  
language] 
… to be a 
[dominant 
religion] 
… to 
respect 
[country 
nationality
] political 
institutions 
and laws 
… to feel 
[country  
nationality
] 
AT95 Austria 75 92 81 93 56 92 93 
AT03 Austria 81 93 80 92 56 88 91 
AU95 Australia 64 91 66 90 33 95 95 
AU03 Australia 71 91 72 92 37 91 95 
BE13-Belgium 74 87 80 87 18 89 84 
BG95 Bulgaria 88 89 82 90 72 87 96 
BG03 Bulgaria 90 89 89 95 77 91 99 
CA95 Canada 52 88 55 79 26 93 86 
CA03 Canada 82 96 83 93 54 97 92 
CH03 Switzerland 58 82 68 93 41 96 78 
CH13-Switzerland 61 84 73 96 32 96 88 
CL03 Chile 90 92 91 87 54 91 96 
CZ95 Czech Republic 71 83 81 95 22 85 93 
CZ03 Czech Republic 79 87 83 93 28 80 90 
CZ13-Czech Republic 85 91 82 96 29 82 90 
DE95 Germany 54 81 66 89 30 91 76 
DE03 Germany 64 82 69 94 29 89 76 
DE13-Germany 60 84 70 94 25 93 77 
DK03 Denmark 69 85 73 97 33 96 90 
DK13-Denmark 61 84 69 95 25 96 90 
EE13-Estonia 54 82 61 96 14 91 97 
ES95 Spain 78 83 83 82 47 88 89 
ES03 Spain 89 89 88 84 44 92 89 
ES13-Spain 79 82 82 91 35 79 82 
FI03 Finland 70 85 65 86 24 88 87 
FI13-Finland 60 80 61 85 22 94 84 
FR03 France 63 86 71 95 18 96 93 
FR13-France 67 90 72 97 19 98 94 
GB95 Great Britain 80 88 77 89 36 88 80 
GB03 Great Britain 76 88 74 91 35 87 80 
GB13-Great Britain  82 90 83 97 32 89 83 
GE13-Georgia 69 81 82 93 80 87 95 
HR13-Croatia 64 79 65 84 56 72 83 
HU95 Hungary 69 76 76 97 36 64 99 
HU03 Hungary 72 78 77 96 43 86 97 
HU13-Hungary 82 88 84 95 46 83 96 
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I95 Italy 78 83 85 86 53 88 92 
IE95 Ireland 87 93 83 43 55 88 96 
IE03 Ireland 87 93 79 39 59 80 89 
IE13-Ireland 85 90 76 37 33 76 86 
IL03 Israel 67 84 83 89 83 85 89 
IL13-Israel 57 76 78 77 70 80 81 
IN13-India 94 95 77 63 62 89 89 
IS13-Iceland 59 92 66 94 28 89 93 
JP95 Japan 69 84 69 71 27 72 89 
JP03 Japan 77 87 74 78 25 68 88 
JP13-Japan 70 87 68 76 21 72 87 
KR03 Korea (South) 81 88 69 88 41 78 92 
KR13-Korea (South) 82 90 71 87 46 83 93 
LT13-Lithuania 79 92 81 96 59 81 90 
LV95 Latvia 74 81 82 91 38 94 97 
LV03 Latvia 76 80 81 91 25 84 91 
LV13-Latvia 78 85 86 92 27 86 92 
MX13-Mexico 85 87 84 84 58 80 88 
NL95 Netherlands 53 78 60 96 8 85 83 
NL03 Netherlands 50 83 57 98 13 94 84 
NO95 Norway 64 90 72 96 22 97 91 
NO03 Norway 67 91 73 97 21 97 86 
NO13-Norway 64 92 73 98 22 98 90 
NZ95 New Zealand 76 87 74 88 30 89 91 
NZ03 New Zealand 87 92 81 92 38 87 93 
PH95 Philippines 96 96 92 93 83 89 95 
PH03 Philippines 96 96 90 96 85 91 97 
PH13-Philippines 96 96 93 95 86 90 96 
PL95 Poland 82 88 83 92 53 86 97 
PL03 Poland 88 91 83 95 75 82 97 
PT03 Portugal 92 93 89 95 66 92 94 
PT13-Portugal 81 91 82 96 37 90 95 
RU95 Russia 72 80 80 82 40 86 94 
RU03 Russia 85 87 85 84 59 83 92 
RU13-Russia 88 90 87 88 74 86 91 
SE95 Sweden 54 87 63 96 18 99 88 
SE03 Sweden 51 85 57 96 18 97 85 
SE13-Sweden 42 82 48 94 10 97 81 
SI95 Slovenia 72 84 77 95 35 87 92 
SI13-Slovenia 58 76 63 89 23 80 85 
SK95 Slovakia 66 86 77 93 27 88 95 
SK03 Slovakia 59 70 64 86 50 67 74 
SK13-Slovak Republic 86 91 85 96 54 77 90 
TR13-Turkey 85 89 82 87 89 86 79 
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TW03 Taiwan 66 80 74 59 26 92 92 
TW13-Taiwan 62 80 73 73 19 91 96 
US95 United States 71 94 74 93 55 93 87 
US03 United States 80 97 83 97 68 96 94 
US13-United States 69 94 70 93 45 93 86 
UY03 Uruguay 89 88 90 86 29 87 97 
VE03 Venezuela 97 97 98 96 72 93 99 
ZA03 South Africa 92 94 87 89 79 80 88 
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Table A2: Sample sizes and average position in two dimensional MCA-space 
 n Position first dimension Position second dimension 
AT95 Austria 908 0.21 -0.05 
AT03 Austria 860 0.2 0.11 
AU95 Australia 1706 -0.06 -0.4 
AU03 Australia 1471 0.03 -0.23 
BG95 Bulgaria 1081 0.31 0.24 
BE13-Belgium 1651 -0.12 -0.07 
BG03 Bulgaria 1043 0.48 0.17 
CA95 Canada 1117 -0.41 -0.37 
CA03 Canada 898 0.31 -0.07 
CH03 Switzerland 789 -0.24 -0.29 
CH13-Switzerland 797 -0.09 -0.43 
CL03 Chile 1471 0.36 0.18 
CZ03 Czech Republic 1119 0.02 0.1 
CZ13-Czech Republic 1797 0.11 0.08 
CZ95 Czech Republic 1014 -0.04 -0.18 
DE95 Germany 1734 -0.39 -0.25 
DE03 Germany 1136 -0.28 -0.14 
DE13-Germany 1495 -0.27 -0.29 
DK03 Denmark 1259 -0.01 -0.39 
DK13-Denmark 1209 -0.15 -0.5 
EE13-Estonia 679 -0.26 -0.63 
ES03 Spain 1165 0.19 0.18 
ES13-Spain 1079 -0.09 0.25 
ES95 Spain 1204 0.01 0.16 
FI03 Finland 1287 -0.22 -0.16 
FI13-Finland 1142 -0.38 -0.34 
FR03 France 1484 -0.1 -0.51 
FR13-France 1776 -0.01 -0.54 
GB03 Great Britain 796 -0.09 0.06 
GB13-Great Britain a 783 0.1 0 
GB95 Great Britain 980 -0.05 0.12 
GE13-Georgia 1459 0.19 0.09 
HR13-Croatia 917 -0.32 0.37 
HU03 Hungary 999 0.02 -0.15 
HU13-Hungary 967 0.21 0.1 
HU95 Hungary 979 -0.14 0.16 
I95 Italy 1074 0.1 0.14 
IE03 Ireland 1009 -0.13 0.93 
IE13-Ireland 1009 -0.35 0.88 
IE95 Ireland 953 -0.01 0.67 
IL03 Israel 521 0.14 0.26 
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IL13-Israel 571 -0.25 0.37 
IN13-India 1453 0.13 0.56 
IS13-Iceland 965 -0.12 -0.4 
JP03 Japan 1055 -0.24 0.42 
JP13-Japan 1193 -0.34 0.27 
JP95 Japan 1205 -0.36 0.32 
KR03 Korea (South) 1310 -0.05 0.2 
KR13-Korea (South) 1272 0.05 0.16 
LT13-Lithuania 1126 0.19 0.21 
LV03 Latvia 606 -0.09 -0.03 
LV13-Latvia 677 0.05 -0.04 
LV95 Latvia 651 0.07 -0.24 
MX13-Mexico 973 0.12 0.43 
NL03 Netherlands 1637 -0.39 -0.66 
NL95 Netherlands 1918 -0.49 -0.43 
NO03 Norway 1339 -0.05 -0.42 
NO13-Norway 1358 -0.02 -0.52 
NO95 Norway 1381 -0.04 -0.5 
NZ03 New Zealand 788 0.19 0.06 
NZ95 New Zealand 800 -0.04 -0.09 
PH03 Philippines 1189 0.62 0.31 
PH13-Philippines 1183 0.63 0.35 
PH95 Philippines 1185 0.59 0.4 
PL03 Poland 1258 0.39 0.31 
PL95 Poland 1544 0.22 0.08 
PT03 Portugal 1462 0.45 0.17 
PT13-Portugal 933 0.21 -0.12 
RU03 Russia 2264 0.17 0.35 
RU13-Russia 1472 0.32 0.38 
RU95 Russia 1551 -0.08 0.06 
SE03 Sweden 1004 -0.34 -0.66 
SE13-Sweden 922 -0.57 -0.79 
SE95 Sweden 1112 -0.24 -0.67 
SI13-Slovenia 944 -0.44 -0.15 
SI95 Slovenia 931 -0.01 -0.14 
SK13-Slovak Republic 1100 0.21 0.35 
SK95 Slovakia 2414 -0.26 0.04 
TR13-Turkey 1610 0.22 0.56 
TW03 Taiwan 2001 -0.34 0.03 
TW13-Taiwan 1896 -0.3 -0.23 
US03 United States 1064 0.41 -0.06 
US13-United States 1043 0.02 -0.17 
US95 United States 1215 0.11 -0.1 
UY03 Uruguay 991 0.18 0.09 
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VE03 Venezuela 1035 0.66 0.23 
ZA03 South Africa 2187 0.37 0.6 
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Table A3: List of supplementary variables in MCA analyses  
Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]1. Others say 
they are 
not important. How important do you think each of the following is... to have [COUNTRY 
NATIONALITY] ancestry  
1. Very important. 
2. Fairly important. 
3. Not very important. 
4. Not important at all. 
 
How proud are you of being [COUNTRY NATIONALITY]?  
1. Very proud. 
2. Somewhat proud. 
3. Not very proud. 
4. Not proud at all. 
 
How close do you feel to you country  
1. Very close. 
2. Close. 
3. Not very close. 
4. Not close at all. 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Television should give preference to 
[COUNTRY] films and programmes 
1. Agree strongly. 
2. Agree. 
3. Neither agree nor disagree. 
4. Disagree. 
5. Disagree strongly. 
 
Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct 
customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. 
Which of these views comes closer to your own? 
1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. 
2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society. 
 
Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be... 
1. Increased a lot. 
2. Increased a little. 
3. Remain the same. 
4. Reduced a little. 
5. Reduced a lot. 
 
 
 
 
